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ABSTRACT 
I will be presenting the argument that the doctrine of breach of confidence in 
New Zealand should be developed in line with the present English approach. This 
consists of reasoning based around two fundamental premises. Firstly, that a 
confidential relationship is no longer an essential requirement between the parties 
concerned, and secondly, that privacy interests such as are protected presently in New 
Zealand by the tort of invasion of privacy can be brought within and protected by the 
breach of confidence doctrine. 
I will be aided in my analysis by the seminal article entitled "Commonalities 
Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy" by Daniel Laster. Given the position I 
am taking, I submit that Laster based his views and analysis on outdated information, 
and is therefore wrong in his analysis of the applicable law in this area. Breach of 
confidence should be developed to encompass privacy interests to the extent 
recognised in English law. The necessary corollary of this is that New Zealand should 
not continue to recognize the tort of invasion of privacy. 
The requirement of a pre-existing relationship has arguably disappeared in the 
United Kingdom, and there are suggestions that the same could happen here and that 
it is desirable for this to be so. I argue that the privacy interests which the tort of 
privacy in New Zealand aims to protect, can fall squarely within the ambit of breach 
of confidence, considering that one of the primary interests inherent in both actions is 
one of autonomy, as Laster has defined it, which necessarily rests on an element of 
control over personal information about oneself. Confidence and privacy are not so 
different in some important ways. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
bibliography and appendices) comprises approximately 15 100 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In 1990 Daniel Laster wrote a seminal article in the New Zealand 
Universities Law Review which stated that the doctrine of breach of confidence and 
the tort of invasion of privacy as recognised in New Zealand are conceptually 
distinct causes of action and should therefore be treated separately. The time has 
come to revisit his article and update it in light of significant jurisprudential 
developments in the arena of personal information. I will be presenting the 
argument that the doctrine of breach of confidence in New Zealand should be 
developed in line with the present English approach. This consists of reasoning 
based around two fundamental premises: first, that a confidential relationship is no 
longer an essential requirement between the parties concerned, and secondly, that 
privacy interests such as are protected presently in New Zealand by the tort of 
invasion of privacy can be brought within and protected by the breach of confidence 
doctrine. The necessary corollary of this is that New Zealand should not continue to 
recognize the distinct cause of action of the tort of invasion of privacy. 
I will be aided in my analysis of this issue by the seminal article 
aforementioned, entitled "Commonalities Between Breach of Confidence and 
Privacy". Given the position I am taking, I submh that Laster based his views and 
analysis on information which is no longer relevant and that his viewpoints do not 
hold nearly as much force today as they did a decade ago, and therefore must be 
updated. I submit that he is therefore wrong in his analysis of the applicable law in 
this area today 
I will firstly summarise Laster's primary arguments and will discuss some 
aspects of the "traditional" approach to breach of confidence in relation to his 
arguments. These arguments are based on the reasoning that confidentiality and 
privacy interests are different. I shall challenge that assumption and will go on to 
consider whether confidence interests and privacy interests really are different and 
conclude that to the extent to which New Zealand protects privacy interests, breach 
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of confidence and privacy should are not and so should not be treated differently. In 
attempting to answer this question I will be examining Laster's views about the 
different bases for the causes of action and will be arguing that his assertions are, as 
mentioned above, wrong today. I will then look at how the English courts have dealt 
with breach of confidence and have seen fit to extend this cause of action to protect 
privacy interests of individuals. I will conclude that the New Zealand courts should 
follow the approach advocated by Randerson J in Hosking v Runting 1, in which he 
supported the approach of treating privacy interests as adequately protected under 
the action for breach of confidence. 
II LASTER: BREACH OF CONFIDENCE, PRIVACY AND PERSONAL 
INFORMATION 
Laster's arguments centre on the key premise that interests underlying breach 
of confidence and privacy are fundamentally different. Breach of confidence, 
accordin to Laster has four distinct interests - the value and importance of candour 
and full disclosure in certain relationships; encouraging "trust, loyalty and good 
- ----
faith" in relationships; protecting individuals' rights to privacy; and ensuring that "a 
c~ers interest in obtaining any benefits which would flow from dissemination or 
us,:._of information originating from them is protected."2 By contrast, the tort of 
privacy has only the privacy interests at its base. These privacy interests stem from 
the "touchstone" of "individual autonomy in the form of an individual's dignity."3 
The important thing to note about this definition is that, in the context of personal 
information, especially in light of the fact that privacy protection in New Zealand is 
limited to the public disclosure of private facts 4 is that "[i]n the context of personal 
information this would mean recognition of an individual's right to determine who 
1 (30 May 2003) High Court, Auckland CP527/02 Randerson J. 
2 Daniel Laster "Breaches of Confidence and of Privacy by Misuse of Personal Information" ( 1989) 7 
Otago LR 31, 35 . 
3 Laster , above, 61. 
4 P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC) 
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can learn about the individual."5 As Laster, himself says, this links strongly to the 
element of control. I will discuss this concept further on in the article. 
However, for this section of the essay I will go on to give a summary of 
Laster's primary arguments relating to varying aspects of the "common" elements of 
breach of confidence and privacy and why he thinks the two causes of action should 
be kept separate. In doing so I will be incorporating his arguments within a 
discussion of the "traditional" approach to the doctrine of breach of confidence (and 
its corresponding privacy element where appropriate). It is Laster's focus on the 
necessity for a confidential relationship between the parties concerned which 
underlies his arguments in comparing breach of confidence and the tort of invasion 
of privacy. Therefore, what must be kept in mind throughout this section is Laster's 
assertion of the foundation for comparison of the two causes of action - "that breach 
of confidence is founded upon . a confidential relationship whereas invasion of 
privacy is founded upon an individual's right of autonomy to decide who will learn 
about them. "6 
I will be discussing the well-known test for breach of confidence as set out 
by Megarry Jin Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd7, however, I will be presenting 
the elements out of order, starting with the second element of the Coco v Clark test 
which relates to the presence of a confidential 'relationship", as it gives suitable 
background with which to discuss the first element of confidentiality of information 
especially in light of how, Laster argues, a relationship affects the status of the 
confidentiality or privateness of personal information. 
Laster does not discuss in detail the differences between breach of 
confidence and privacy relating to the element of imparting information m 
confidential circumstances (that is, within the context of a relationship, real or 
5 Daniel Laster, above, 61. 
6 Daniel Laster "Commonalities Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy" (1990) 14 NZULR 144, 
144. 
7 [1969] RPC 41 (HC) 
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constructed). My conclusion on this issue is that if where there is actually some kind 
of relationship present in an action for invasion of privacy, or conversely, where 
there is no relationship in the traditional sense in an action for breach of confidence, 
the two causes of action are very similar. However, I will outline the second element 
and its relevance to breach of confidence and privacy for personal information, 
notwithstanding that a "relationship" of confidence or imparting if information in 
circumstances of confidentiality is not needed to succeed in a privacy action. 
A Imparted in Confulential Circumstances - The need for a "Relationship" 
or Confidential Circumstances 
This element requires that the information in issue must be "imparted in 
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence". 8 This can be by way of the 
express or implied terms of an agreement9, through a special relationship between 
the parties 10 or by virtue of the circumstances in which the information was divulged 
to the confidence breaker. 11 
Contractual agreements most usually clearly mark out when information is 
being imparted in confidential circumstances. The courts can imply this through 
either the express or implied terms of the particular agreement. Furthermore, there 
are special types of pre-existing relationships where "the element of confidence is so 
marked that they can be regarded as being essentially relationships of confidence 
quite apart from any element of contract" 12• These include employer-employee 
8 Coco v AN Clark ( Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 46 (HC) Megarry J. 
9 See the series of Spycatcher litigation -Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 
3 All ER 545 (HL(E)) where a member of the British secret service was held to be under a contractual 
duty of confidence not to divulge confidential information gained during his employment. 
10 See, for example T v Attorney-General [1988] NZFLR 357 (FC) which concerned obligations of 
confidence between a social worker and client. 
11 The test for this is often cited as being" . ... where a reasonable man standing in the shoes of the 
recipient of the information would have realized upon reasonable grounds that the information was 
being given to him in confidence." Coco v AN Clark ( Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41,48 (HC) 
Megarry J. See the case of New Zealand Health and Nature v GA Thompson (3 February 2000) High 
Court, Christchurch CP6/00 Chisholm J, which discussed the relevance of the plaintiffs actions in 
making sure that the confidentiality of the information was brought home to the defendant. 
12 United Kingdom Law Commission Breach of Confidence (WP58, London, 1974) 13. 
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relationships 13, marital and domestic relationships 14 and professional relationships 
such as doctor-patient and solicitor-client relationships 15 . 
Apart from those specific recognized categories of special confidential 
relationships as mentioned above, one of the most common forms of a "relationship 
of confidence" arises where information is imparted in sufficiently confidential 
circumstances. A relationship is constructed by virtue of the precise circumstances 
themselves. A reasonable test in determining whether this can be done in any 
particular case is "[ ... ] if the circumstances are such that any reasonable man 
standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realized that 
upon reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then 
this should suffice to impose on him the equitable obligation of confidence". 16 This 
is effectively where an undertaking of confidence, express or implied, has been 
given. 17 This test is broad enough to cover the wide range of situations in which 
confidential information comes into the hands of people, and so would, on a 
conventional analysis, sit perfectly with the courts' ability to infer a confidential 
relationship existing by reason of the circumstances of communication.18 
Additionally, there are a number of recognised exceptions to the need for a 
confidential relationship or confidential circumstances - information obtained by 
improper or surreptitious means, information held by third parties, information not 
divulged to anyone, and accidentally acquired information 19 
13 See for example, Cranleigh Precision Engineering Ltd v Bryant [1966) RPC 81 (QB) 14 Argyll v Argyll [1967) Ch 302 (Ch). 
15 G v Day [1982] l NSWLR 24 (SC). 
16 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 48 (HC) Megarry J. 
17 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New 'Zealand (4ed, Oxford University Press, 
Wellington, 1999) 149-150. 
18 See, for example Stephens v Avery [1988] 2 All ER 477,482 (Ch) where Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
stated that "The basis of equitable intervention to protect confidentiality is that it is unconscionable 
for a person who has received information on the basis that it is confidential subsequently to reveal 
that information. Although the relationship between the parties is often important in cases where it is 
said there is an implied as opposed to express obligation of confidence, the relationship between the 
parties is not the determining factor. It is the acceptance of the information on the basis that it will be 
kept secret that affects the conscience of the recipient of the information." 
19 Sally Fitzgerald and Victoria Heine Confidential Information (New Zealand Law Society, 
Wellington, October 2002) 36. As to accidentally acquired information, see the comments of Lord 
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1 The Exceptions 
As to information improperly or surreptitiously obtained, the courts have 
been willing to imply an obligation of confidence in such situations - "the principle 
upon which the Court of Chancery has acted for many years has been to restrain the 
publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained or of 
information imparted in circumstances which ought not to be divulged."20 It has 
been asked whether and how a "general equitable basis could extend to cover the 
situation where there is no 'relationship of confidence' in the context of which 
information is imparted."21 Megan Richardson has suggested two solutions. Firstly,) 
one based on a restitution analysis and econ 1>') one based on a broad 
'unconscionability' basis22 
Looking at the restitution argument, it is based on the need to provide a 
person who has suffered by way of the tortious acts of another, with financial 
recompense. The main arguments against preferring to apply this approach to the 
case of surreptitiously or unlawfully obtained information, is primarily that it does 
not seem an "appropriate way to categorise the treatment of a party who breaches the 
confidentiality of private and personal information (and who may do so for personal 
motives rather than economic 'benefit')."23 This view ignores the fact that for many 
breaches of confidentiality or privacy of this kind, a monetary-type value placed on 
such breach is inappropriate and does not reflect the damage, which has occurred to 
the individual plaintiffs. Often, hurt and distress cannot be adequately compensated 
by money, and so to describe liability in essentially monetary terms seems somewhat 
insensitive and ignorant of the real damage, which has occurred. 
Goff in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 (HL(E)) at pages 
658-659. 
20 Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469, 475 (ChD) Swinfen Eady LJ 
21 Megan Richardson "Breach of Confidence, Surreptitiously or Accidentally Obtained Information 
and Privacy: Theory versus Law" (1993) 19 MULR 673, 695. 
22 Richardson, above, 697. 
23 Richardson, above, 696. 
6 
An unconscionability approach would seem to accord most with the 
traditionally accepted rationale, that of equity stepping in to protect unconscionable 
behaviour, especially where someone takes advantage of another's vulnerability -
"Applying this to the case of surreptitiously or accidentally obtained information ot 
a personal or private nature, a person who surreptitiously or accidentally obtains 
such information and who knows or has reason to know that the owner is vulnerable 
to its not being treated as confidential, acts unconscionably in disclosing the 
information."24 
Third parties can be restrained from using information received from a party 
to the confidence, where that person has knowledge or notice of the breach of 
confidence by the confidant. As Lord Greene said in Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v 
Campbell Engineering Co Ltd, 25 "[i]f a defendant is proved to have used 
confidential information, directly or indirectly obtained from a plaintiff, without the 
consent, express or implied, of the plaintiff, he will be guilty of an infringement of 
the plaintiff's rights". 26 
It is disputed as to exactly when liability arises - is it when a third party first 
acquires notice of the original breach of confidence, or when the third party first 
receives the information?27 This may be important in cases where plaintiffs are 
seeking protection for privacy interests. If the protection of privacy interests is 
considered "paramount" then arguably the liability should attach on acquisition of 
the information, and not when knowledge of the breach is acquired. 28 This would be 
based on the view that the information itself and its intrinsic value is to be protected, 
rather than the obligation of confidence which the third party has gained notice of. 29 
24Richardson, above, 697 . 
25 (1948) 65 RPC 203 (CA). 
26 Saltman Engineering Co Ud v Campbell Engineering Co Ud case (1948) 65 RPC 203, 213 (CA) 
Lord Greene MR. 
27 Andrea Thompson Breach of Confidence: Third Party Recipients of Personal Information (LLB 
(Hons) Legal Writing Requirement, Victoria University of Wellington, 1991) 24. 
28Thompson, above, 25. 
29 Thompson, above, 21 . 
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These considerations link back to the underlying bases of breach of 
confidence to begin with - obligations of confidence between the parties and 
enforcing a general duty of good faith. If protection were given to "confidential" 
,...---_- - -(and in this case personal) information from the point of acquisition of the 
information, no matter how innocent the recipient of the information was, "[t]he 
imposition of liability [from acquisition] would disregard equity's concern with the 
defendant's conscience."30 This in turn relates to the third party's "derivative nature 
of their liability" from the breaching confidant. 31 This would seem to bypass all 
reasons for enjoining unauthorized use of confidential information by a breaching 
confidant in the first place. If privacy and the "intrinsic value" of the information in 
isolation were the touchstone for liability in breach of confidence, liability would 
extend too far and to too many prospective defendants who had acted innocently in 
the circumstances. 
This links back to the limited form of privacy, which we recognize in New 
Zealand - the public disclosure of private facts. While private information certainly 
holds intrinsic value to individuals, it is the loss of control over the disclosure of that 
information which the courts aim to protect. This must be considered in any case 
where confidentiality or privacy is at stake. The "intrinsic" value of information in 
itself is not sufficient, and arguably this is why a corresponding test in privacy (that 
the disclosure of private information must be highly offensive or objectionable to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities)32 to the obligation or relationship 
element in breach of confidence must be satisfied first before a breach of privacy can 
be made out. 
Additionally, if the courts were to find liability on acquisition and not actual 
or constructive knowledge of the confidentiality or privateness of the information, 
the value of "privacy" of information looked at in isolation from obligations of 
confidence would seem to have an undue effect on freedom of speech in this 
30 Thompson, above, 25. 
31 Thompson, above, 25. 
32 p v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC). 
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situation. As has been argued, freedom of expression is only to be restricted so far as 
is reasonable necessary to protect a countervailing right, and liability for breach of 
confidence on acquisition of confidential information, especially if looking at the 
basis for liability in breach of confidence in the first place (such as obligations of 
confidence and a general duty of good faith and loyalty) would be an "unjustified 
restriction on this right". 33 When privacy interests are looked at in the context of 
breach of confidence however, other factors will be given weight such as the 
obligations sought to be upheld under the traditional breach of confidence action. 
Therefore undue weight is not given to privacy interests in isolation as a wide-
reaching veil of restriction over another's right to freedom of expression or freedom 
of speech. Understandably then, it is wise to conclude that the liability of third party 
recipients of confidential information should lie from the point of notice of the 
breach by which the information was obtained - "however innocent the acquisition 
of the knowledge, what will be restrained is the use or disclosure of it after notice of 
the impropriety". 34 
Laster would focus on the next type of situation to assert that breach of 
confidence, as it protects such distinct interests as privacy, would not provide 
protection for a plaintiff where a third party "acquires" confidential information 
from a person who has not divulged it to anyone. This can occur in a situation such 
as when a person writes in their personal diary, and intends the information to 
remam confidential to themselves.35 This circumstance would fail to satisfy the 
second element of the Coco v Clark test - it has not been communicated in 
confidential circumstances to another person, unless it is considered that the person 
who comes across the formula or diary is the person to whom the information is 
"communicated to" (giving "communicated to" a very broad definition). On this 
traditional view, breach of confidence would fail to give the protection required 
because an obligation of confidence has not been breached. This again links back to 
what the relevance of the basis of the confidence action is to Laster's arguments -
33Thompson, above, 26. 
34 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No 2) [1979] 2 All ER 620,634 (ChD) Megarry J. 
35 United Kingdom Law Commission Breach of Confidence (WP48, London, 1974) 19. 
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that the action 1s there primarily to protect obligations of confidence. If the 
conscience of a "confidant" is not in existence to be enjoined, it does not seem 
logical to create a duty where no obligations exist. Equity would arguably be seeking 
to enjoin an imaginary persona in order to attach liability to the third party acquirer 
of the information. However, the courts may place emphasis on the nature of the 
information itself in question and so find that a breach of confidence has occurred -
this would be in light of the approach taken by the courts in England recently and 
especiaJJy considering the recent view that "it may be that certain information is so 
sensitive that it must be clear to all the world that it was not meant to be divulged."36 
Since the courts have clearly protected the surreptitious obtaining of confidential 
information37 based on the rationale that "the acquirer can be said to be fixed with 
the knowledge that the information is obviously confidential because of the 
surreptitious way in which it has to be obtained", industrial espionage cases are 
clearly covered in these situations.38 These types of cases could also be seen as a 
forerunner to the approach taken in regards to recent cases involving surreptitious 
taking of photographs of plaintiffs in private situations - if a photographer can only 
obtain photographs surreptitiously of plaintiffs in private situations or settings, the 
confidentiality wiJJ be implied by virtue of the means needed to obtain the 
photographs. 39 
As to accidentaJJy acquired information, an early authority on this point, on 
whether protection wiJJ be afforded in such a situation, is the dictum of Lord Goff in 
Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Lttf0 where he, in discussing that a 
relationship wiJJ not always be necessary, states in broad terms that circumstances 
36 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (4ed, Oxford University Press , 
Auckland, 1999) 157. 
37 Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers [1984] 1 WLR 892 (CA) ; Franklin v Giddins [1978] Qd R 
72 (SC). 
38 Katrine Evans Privacy and Publicity: Restraining Abuses of Power In New Zealand ( LLM 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1999) 80. 
39 See, for example, the case of Hellewe/1 v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 4 All ER 473 (QB) 
at 476 where Laws J said that "if someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance and with 
no authority a picture of another engaged in some private act, this subsequent disclosure of the 
photograph wouldm in my judgment, as surely amount to a breach of confidence as if he had found or 
stolen a letter in which the act was recounted and proceeded to publish it." 
40 [1988] 3 ALL ER 545 (HL(E)). 
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where breach of confidence would possibly be able protect certain information 
include "certain situations, beloved of law teachers, where an obviously confidential 
document is wafted by an electric fan out of a window into a crowded street, or 
when another obviously confidential document, such as a private diary, is dropped in 
a public street and is then picked up by a passer-by."41 The theory remains, as with 
surreptitiously acquired information, that liability can still attach to a person who 
divulges the information after obtaining it accidentally. This is because, as 
mentioned above, !he private nature of the information may be so clear that liab~ity _ 
should attach solely for that rea~ An obligation of confidence is inferred by the 
very confidential nature of the information in issue. 
The relationship of confidence, as seen above is essential to Laster's 
arguments in asserting the differences between confidentiality interests and privacy 
interests. His focus on the relationship element infuses his discussions, as will be 
seen below, on what information is considered sufficiently private or confidential. 
According to Laster, the relationship makes all the difference. 
B Confulential Information- What is confidential or private? 
The preceding discussion gives relevant background within which to discuss 
the first element of breach of confidence set out in Coco v Clark, 42 which is whether 
personal information is sufficiently confidential or private. Laster ultimately 
contends that the "relationship of confidence" present in traditional breach of 
confidence affects the confidentiality or privateness of the personal information in 
any particular case. 
The information concerned must "have the necessary quality of confidence 
about it.43 What information satisfies this requirement has been relatively consistent 
among the authorities - "[ ... ] 'something which is public property and public 
41 [1988) 3 All ER 545, 658-659 (HL(E)) Lord Goff. 
42 [1969) RPC 41 (HC) 
43 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ud [ 1969) RPC 41, 46 (HC) Megarry J. 
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knowledge' cannot per se provide any foundation for proceedings for breach of 
confidence."44 The most common forms of confidential information have been in the 
commercial sector and have included trade secrets "particularly in the sense of secret 
processes, recipes, designs and formulae ... "45 State secrets are also a recognized 
category of confidential information and were the subject of litigation in the well-
known case of Attorney-General for United Kingdom v Wellington Newspapers Ltd. 
46 
The major issue that the courts have been faced with in the last few decades 
has been in deciding what the status of the law of breach of confidence is in relation 
to private information. It has been acknowledged historically, and presently that 
private information can certainly be protected by the law of breach of confidence. In 
Stephens v Avery47 where sexual conduct of the plaintiff was the subject of breach of 
confidence proceedings, it was held that there was no reason why "information 
relating to that most private sector of everybody's life, namely sexual conduct, 
cannot be the subject of a legally enforceable duty of confidentiality."48 However, 
many cases involving personal information (including Stephens v Avery) have also 
involved a relationship of some kind existing between the parties. In Argyll v 
Argyll49 , for example, marital confidences were held to be privileged, but the 
personal information itself was considered in light of its disclosure within the 
marriage relationship. The specific type of relationship was one which the courts 
were willing to protect, rather than the information itself, Thomas-Ungoed J 
remarking "there could hardly be anything more intimate or confidential than is 
involved in that relationship, or that in the mutual trust and confidences which are 
shared between husband and wife."50 This has meant that the issue of whether 
44 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Lt, above, 47, Megarry J citing Lord Greene in Saltman Engineering 
Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203, 215 (CA) . 
45 Stephen Todd et al The law of Torts in New 'Zealand (2ed, Brookers, Wellington, 1997) 805. See, 
for example Merryweather v Moore [1892] 2 Ch 518 (ChD) which involved the detailed dimensions 
of fire engines. 
46 [1988] l NZLR 129 (CA). 
47 [1988] Ch 449 (ChD) 
48 Stephens v Avery [1988] 2 All ER 477,482 (ChD) Lord Browne-Wilkinson VC. 
49 [1967] Ch 302 (ChD). 
50 Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302, 322 (ChD). 
personal information in isolation, is eligible for protection where there is no special 
relationship, has not been fully resolved, at least until recently. 
Laster has made it clear that a relationship of confidence is relevant when 
determining whether there is an obligation of confidence to begin with. However, it 
is fair to say that he must also be arguing that a relationship of confidence is also 
relevant in classifying the nature of the information initially at the start. His 
arguments seem to be, that a confidential relationship can effectively tum public 
information for example, into confidential information by the very reason of its 
imparting in confidential circumstances or in the context of a confidential 
relationship. 
Laster gives four tests which he says courts apply when determining whether 
information is sufficiently private or confidential and the important consequence of 
having information come under breach of confidence or privacy. The tests are those 
of "accessibility, extensivity, territoriality, and temporal limitation".51 
1 Public Accessibility 
If the information in issue has the general quality of "inaccessibility" about 
it, it will generally be considered to be sufficiently confidential or private.52 Laster 
looks at this issue in terms of information contained in public records, the 
extensiveness of publication, and information obtained through public or private 
places. 
(a) Public Records 
The main point that Laster seeks to make in regards to publicly available 
records is the fact that with breach of confidence, information such as births, 
51 Daniel Laster "Commonalities Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy" (1990) 14 NZULR 
144, 146. 
52 Laster, above, 146. 
13 
marnages or convictions may have a necessary quality of confidence about it by 
virtue of the fact that it was disclosed in the confines of a special relationship. He 
makes the suggestion that it may be because of a special relationship, that the 
confidant may be aware of the confider's "particular concern about publication or 
use of such information."53 In contrast, information which is the subject of an action 
for invasion of privacy, will not have the same "relationship" underlying it and will 
therefore be able to be used simply because looked at in isolation, it is not 
sufficiently private to warrant protection. 
Looking at this situation, it is clear that the same information will attract 
differing levels of protection depending on what action is invoked. The issue of 
whether publicly accessible records should attract a level of confidentiality in certain 
situations is already controversial. With the addition of the distinction between the 
status of information within a confidential relationship and information within a 
private scenario being as defined as Laster has asserted, the controversy becomes 
deeper. Why should the information regarding a person's conviction for sexual 
assault, for example be protected from disclosure by a confidant because it was only 
by reason of a "relationship" that the confider knew of the information? (regardless 
that they could have looked it up in public records). 
In this type of situation it would be the relationship which is protecting the 
information in issue and not the "privateness" of the information itself. This would 
suggest that the first element of the Coco v Clark test is somewhat misleading - it is 
the relationship or obligation of confidence (in line with the approach in the recent 
English cases) which matters. The nature of the information appears simply as an 
initial consideration. This also raises questions about the "privateness" of publicly 
available information in the first place. 
(b) Extensiveness of publication 
53 Laster, above, at 147 - for example that a patient has told his or her doctor that he or she had a past 
criminal conviction, or had recently been divorced. 
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Another factor, which the courts look to, and which Laster identifies as a 
primary test in determining confidential or private information, is the extent of 
publication. This factor relates to whether information is sufficiently confidential if 
it has previously been disclosed. This will depend on the circumstances of the 
disclosure including the audience to whom it was disclosed and circumstances such 
as the duration of the prior disclosure - "It is clear that the publication of 
information to a limited number of persons will not of itself destroy the confidential 
nature of information".54 So, for example in the case of Price Albert v Strange, it 
was held that the certain private etchings had not lost their confidentiality by reason 
of the fact some of the impressions had been given to the plaintiffs' friends. 55 
In most cases, the question will be one of degree, depending on the 
circumstances of each particular case.56Laster mentions G v Day 57 where a 
transitory broadcast of an informant's identity was held not to have been sufficient 
to destroy the confidentiality of that fact. Laster linked this decision back to the 
proposition of "whether or not the confider would reasonably have an interest in 
preventing any further dissemjnation of the information."58 This does not seem too 
problematic as arguably if private information brought under either breach of 
confidence or privacy has been published for a limited purpose and to a limited 
audience, the courts would likely see the information as still private. 59 
An exception to the general rule that the publication of information destroys 
the confidentiality or privateness of the information is where public information has 
become private over time. This is not a concept which is replicated in breach of 
confidence, as once information has become public, its confidentiality has been 
54 Francis Gurry Breach of Confidence (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984) 73. 
55 Gurry, above, 74 discussing Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 64 ER 293,312 (ChD) Knight Bruce 
vc. 
56 Gurry, above, 74. 
57 [1982] 1 NSWLR 24 (SC). 
58 Daniel Laster "Commonalities Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy" ( 1990) 14 NZULR 
144, 151. 
59 Gurry, above, 73. 
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destroyed.60 Under privacy, by contrast, cases such as Melvin v ReiJ51 and Tucker v 
News Media Ownershi/2 have illustrated the courts willingness to fix previously 
publicly disclosed information (a sordid past as a prostitute and criminal convictions 
for sexual offences respectively) with the quality of privateness. 
It has been argued that privacy only can protect public information which has 
become private over time, primarily because the rules relating to public domain 
information in breach of confidence are "too strict" - that is in privacy, a more 
liberal consideration in determining the privateness of information would take place 
- this would include considering things such as where "further breaches of privacy 
are intentional or reckless breaches of community standards." 63 This element also 
has great links to the element of control over personal information - an element 
which I submit forms one of the key interests underlying both breach of confidence 
and privacy as recognised in New Zealand. As one commentator has put it, 
"[ ... ]those who view privacy as a form of control over personal information -
recognize that the information subject may well wish to protect against further, 
perhaps wider dissemination of the information .... "64 By contrast, since "the 
essence of confidentiality is secrecy"65 no such considerations as can be entertained 
in privacy will be applicable. I think what needs to be added though, is that personal 
information in privacy still needs to meet the test of having been publicly 
inaccessible to a degree. 
(c) Public and Private Places 
60 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545,650 (HL(E)) Lord 
Goff 
61 Melvin v Reid (1931) 297 P 91, 93 (Cal Dist Ct) Marks J. 
62 Tucker v News Media Ownership [1986] 2 NZLR 716 (HC). 
63 Katrine Evans Privacy and Publicity Restarining Abuses of Power In New Zealand (LLM Research 
Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1999) 79. 
64Evans, above, 78-79. 
65 Sally Fitzgerald and Victoria Heine Confidential Information (New Zealand Law Society, 
Wellington, October 2002) 19. 
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The place where the fact or information is derived from is also relevant to the 
test of what is accessible or not and therefore what is sufficiently confidential or 
private. For example, if a fact occurs in a public place, this does not automatically 
mean it that it cannot be a confidential or private fact. 66 This is most common where 
the fact concerns humiliating, distressing or embarrassing circumstances which was 
recognised Bathurst City Council v Saban67 which., although not directly concerned 
with invasion of privacy as a tort, recognised that it would be open to the court to 
give relief to a plaintiff in circumstances such as where "someone had taken a 
photograph of [the plaintiff] in a shockingly wounded condition after a road 
accident". 68 
Laster picks up on this idea and links it to whether, regardless of where the 
information is derived from, there is an expectation of privacy by the individual 
seeking protection.69 Again he relates this issue back to the fact that breach of 
confidence would be able to protect information derived from relatively public 
places, that is places where people "have a right to go"70 where the parties involved 
would not have been in a street or a park, for example, but for the existence of a 
relationship between them. 
There are problems with this argument. Laster appears to be arguing that if a 
fact is disclosed in a public place, under breach of confidence the fact may attract 
more protection if the confidant was present in the public place because of some 
relationship with the confider. This situation would be very rare and breach of 
confidence would often not be able to provide protection if such protection was 
limited to particular circumstances such as these. There needs to be protection 
available in a wider variety of circumstances. This is where the determination of the 
confidentiality of information gained from public places by reason of a relationship 
66 Bradley v Wingnut Films (1993) l NZLR 415,424 (HC) Gallen J. 
67 (1985) 2 NSWLR 704 (SC) 
68 Bathurst City Coucil v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 704, (SC) Young J. 
69 Daniel Laster "Commonalities Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy" (1990) 14 NZULR 
144, 148. 
70 Laster, above, 149. 
17 
only poses problems. The focus should be not just upon the relationship (especially 
as this element is becoming disestablished) but the nature of the information itself, 
regardless of where or by what reason the "confidence breaker" comes across the 
information. 
If a relationship element was not necessary in New Zealand to found an 
action for breach of confidence, a plaintiff could have a double chance of gaining 
protection. First, if the information is disclosed in a public place, AND a relationship 
does exist or can readily be inferred, the courts may protect that information by 
adopting a "relationship of trust and confidence needs to be upheld" line of 
reasoning. If there is no such relationship, the courts can look more closely at the 
nature of the information even if it was disclosed in a public place, and also the 
circumstances of obtainment of the information. The courts could then adopt a 
privacy based, "value of the autonomy of the individual over the information needs 
to be protected" line of reasoning. It would of course depend on the facts of each 
case, but at least a number of approaches to this issue would be available for the 
courts to look at. 
(d) Territoriality 
An isolated publication in a certain location is also relevant to the 
confidentiality or privateness of information. As Laster mentions, geographically 
limited publications have been used to successfully assert confidentiality in other 
places.71 This is an extension of the extensiveness of publication consideration. The 
limited geographical publication may be considered to be only to a limited audience 
and for a limited purpose. As has been said " .... availability in one area will not 
necessarily destroy the confidentiality of information in another location."
72 In 
Franchi v Franch/3 it was acknowledged that knowledge of secrets by people in a 
71 Laster, above, 151. 
72 Francis Gurry Breach of Confidence (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984) 76. 
73 Franchi v Franchi [1967] RPC 149 (Ch) Cross J. 
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foreign country does not necessarily destroy the confidentiality in another.74 
(although on the facts in that case, the court held that the information was no longer 
confidential as the patent specification information had become well known in 
England soon after its publication in Belgium). This does not seem to fit too well 
with the notion that a relationship of trust and confidence is one of the cornerstones 
of breach of confidence, as Laster asserts for the simple reason that even if 
information is published in one area, the relationship of trust and confidence has 
been breached all the same. If the focus is on privacy, then 
arguably geographical location may have no impact on the fact that autonomy has 
been interfered with, and control over disclosure has been lost. 
While not directly related to the issue of determining whether personal 
information is sufficiently confidential or private, the duration of the duty to keep 
such information confidential or private in the circumstances is important and, as 
Laster asserts, differs under both causes of action. 
2 The duration of duties in a relationship of confidence 
Another of Laster's arguments on why breach of confidence and privacy 
should be kept separate is based on the duration of duties for upholding the 
confidentiality or privacy of a plaintiff. He considers that where information enters 
the public domain in regards to privacy, there can be no obligation to keep the 
information private, subject to exceptions such as a lengthy passage of time between 
the initial publicity of the information and its republication.75 Conversely, for breach 
of confidence, the obligation to maintain confidentiality is unclear. As he explains, 
the decision of the House of Lords in the Spycatche/6 case gave us two views based 
on the nature of breach of confidence. Lord Griffiths said that the duty of confidence 
remained even when the information has been brought into the public domain. This 
74 Gurry, above, 75 discussing the comments of Cross Jin Franchi v Franchi [1967] RPC 149 at 153 
(Ch). 
75 Daniel Laster "Commonalities Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy" (1990) 14 NZULR 
144, 152. 
76 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988) 3 WLR 776 (HL(E)). 
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was because it would be a mockery of the law if a person could discharge their duty 
by breaching it.77 In contrast Lord Goff commented that this proposition would be 
untenable and even absurd - "is [a confidant] not even to be permitted to mention in 
public what is now common knowledge?"78 The view of the duty remaining because 
of a relationship of trust and confidence existing and the view of the duty remaining 
as long as the value of secrecy of the information being maintained gives rise to 
definitional problems underlying both causes of action. Without the confidentiality 
of subject matter (to a great extent obviously) there is no obligation to keep the 
information "confidential", no matter what type of relationship exists. With private 
information, if there is no private information at all, no protection can be given. 
Since there can be no relationship, the additional protection which could be afforded 
by breach of confidence cannot be invoked. 
D Unauthorised Use of the Information 
Supposing that the other elements of breach of confidence have been made 
out, the third element to be fulfilled consists of an unauthorized use of the 
information.79 This is a factor which does not prove too controversial in its 
application to both breach of confidence and invasion of privacy. While it may seem 
more reprehensible to use information while under obligations of confidence 
because of the inherent trust and confidence present in traditional confidential 
relationships, the breakdown of a need for a relationship, which I argue for, puts the 
test for an unauthorized use of information for breach of confidence and privacy on a 
par. In both actions, unauthorized use will be usually considered as being without 
the plaintiff~ cQnsent. 
In most cases this will be the easiest element to fulfill, as it is assumed that 
there has been an unauthorized use of the information which first gave rise to the 
77 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) , above, 793 Lord Griffiths. 
78 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2),above, 811 Lord Goff. 
79 See Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 at 213 (CA) 
where Lord Denning considered that detriment is not necessary for an action in breach of confidence. 
Simply using confidential information without consent is sufficient for liability. 
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proceedings, or alternatively that there has been a proposed intent to so use the 
information. It is also accepted that a defendant may be liable in an action even if the 
unauthorized use of the information is unintentional or subconscious. 80 
Another more debatable issue in relation to an unauthorized disclosure of 
information is whether detriment is a necessary element. See, for example, the 
comments of Barker J in TA Macalister Ltd v Black where, in discussing the Laws 
of New Zealand said that there is sufficient detriment if information is disclosed to a 
third party "even though that disclosure may not harm the confidor in any way." 81 It 
is generally accepted that detriment is not a necessary element, as there will arguably 
be cases where confidentiality or privacy will still be claimed by a plaintiff who has 
not suffered harm of any kind. This can arise for example, where an anonymous 
donor of money to a charity wishes to maintain anonymity. 82 Megarry J in Coco v 
Clark stated - 83 
At first sight, it seems that detriment ought to be present if equity is to be 
induced to intervene; but I can conceive of cases where a plaintiff might 
have substantial motives for seeking the aid of equity and yet suffer nothing 
which could fairly be called detriment to him, as when the confidential 
information shows them in a favourable light but gravely injures some 
relative or friend of whom he wishes to protect. 
This topic may not be of as much practical significance as the other elements, 
as it is presumably only in a minutely small amount of cases where no detriment has 
accrued, and yet someone still brings an action for breach of confidence. The most 
important consideration in this aspect of the element, is that the obligation rests in 
equity. If a defendant has made unauthorized use of confidential information of the 
plaintiff, that of itself should be able to justify the finding of a breach. In regards to 
privacy, there will usually be some form of detriment through the loss of control 
80 Sally Fitzgerald and Victoria Heine Confidential Information (New Zealand Law Society, 
Wellington, October 2002) 41. See for example Seager v Copydex [1967] 2 All ER 415 at 417 
where it was held that unconscious use of the plaintiffs ideas by the defendant was sufficient for a 
finding of an unauthorized use of the information. 
81 (12 July 1999) High Court Auckland AP45-SW99. 
82 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWCA Civ 1373 para 52 Lord Philips. 
83 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, 48 (HC) Megarry J. 
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over what information is being disclosed, linking always back to the autonomy and 
dignity of a person and their choice as to their involvement in their surrounding 
world as much as possible 
Perhaps it should be the position that detriment is necessary in order for 
equity to intervene in privacy for the essential test is whether the disclosure of 
personal information is highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities. This test connotes some form of traditional harm accruing to 
the plaintiff, hence the disclosure must be offensive or objectionable in some way. 
Nevertheless, in the traditional case of breach of confidence it is the unconscionable 
conduct of the defendant which is sought to be restrained. Perhaps it should make a 
difference to liability if no damage has accrued, but if a plaintiff feels that they have 
suffered in one way or another, this should be a sufficient threshold for intervention 
by the courts. As has been stated before, if actual detriment or prejudice is needed 
before the courts will intervene, this is introducing "into a purely equitable action the 
extra common Jaw requirement that damage or actual harm to the plaintiff must be 
affirmatively proven before an action will lie."84 Maybe harm should be inferred 
from the very fact that an obligation of confidence has been breached. 
While the above factors may be important to the individual plaintiff 
concerned, a wider consideration must come in at the final stage. That is whether 
there is a sufficient public interest at stake in either protecting or disclosing the 
information. Individual protection is set up against essentially the public's right to 
knowledge. 
E Public Interest 
Laster's final major argument on the necessary maintenance of a distinction 
between breach of confidence and privacy is that while the public interest is a factor 
84 Andrea Thompson Breach of Confidence: Third Party Recipients of Personal Information 
(LLB(Hons) Legal Writing Requirement, Victoria University of Wellington, 1991) 21. 
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relevant to both causes of action, the weight given in balancing the public interest on 
one hand and privacy or confidentiality on the other hand, will necessarily differ. 
These tests essentially burden the defendant who wishes to escape liability. It is 
clear, therefore that "even in relationships which prima facie support an obligation 
of confidence, an overriding public interest in disclosure to the relevant audience 
will protect an otherwise unauthorized disclosure. "85 These include, apart from 
things such as government "activities"86 the important constitutional value in "free 
speech, free press, and the public right to know". 87 Laster's primary views on the 
public interest in relation to breach of confidence and privacy are that "a less 
demanding 'of public interest' test may develop in privacy cases rather than [an] 'in 
the public interest' test evolving in breach of confidence."88 The "of public interest 
test" would apply to privacy actions and would imply that public interests 
considerations would focus around such considerations as what the public may be 
legitimately curious in whereas in confidentiality situations the disclosure must be 
"of real concern" to the public in order to justify a disclosure.89 As Laster says "Put 
another way, courts may more readily hold that some public interest in personal 
information overrides privacy than confidentiality. "90 
Laster is essentially hinting that the courts will give greater weight to a 
confidential interest as opposed to a purely private interest and will therefore be 
more willing to allow defences of "its in the public interest" to justify disclosure of 
private facts to the public. This raises the question, why and on what basis does a 
court decide that the interests underlying privacy do not hold as much value in 
society as do the values in breach of confidence? Perhaps a relationship of "candour 
and trust" is inherently more important that dignity and autonomy. Laster's view on 
this primary distinction is the key to understanding why he takes the position he 
does, in that privacy and confidentiality interests need to be kept separate. The 
85 Daniel Laster "Commonalities Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy" (1990) 14 NZULR 
144, 158. 
86 Laster, above, 159. 
87 Laster, above, 159. 
88 Laster, above, 161 citing Lion laboratories Ltd v Evans (1984) 3 WLR 539 (CA) 
89 Laster, above, 161. 
90 Laster, above, 161. 
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problem arises when, as in England, purely personal information can be protected by 
breach of confidence when there is no relationship of trust and confidence. This may 
mean that a lower threshold test will always be applied to cases involving personal 
information, even though the information may be to fit within the traditional breach 
of confidence action. 
Alternatively, while personal information may be harder to place into the 
action for breach of confidence (although this position is rapidly changing) once 
such information does get into that particular cause of action, the higher threshold 
test of being "in the public interest" will apply. So, exactly the same information will 
be protected at different levels via the two differing approaches to a public interest 
test. This is why I would suggest a single doctrine should serve to protect privacy 
interests at the same level, at least for the limited form of privacy which New 
Zealand currently protects. 
Ultimately, Laster derives his views on the distinction between breach of 
confidence and privacy (and the consequent need to continue to maintain such a 
distinction) from the additional interests inherent in breach of confidence. I submit, 
however, the focus should not be on the differences between the two by virtue of the 
presence of additional interests in one cause of action, but rather the focus should 
remain on the recognition of the presence of one unifying interest in both causes of 
action - privacy in the form of autonomy. It is this interest which underlies the two 
causes of action, at least in the developed form of breach of confidence, and renders 
them, for all intensive purposes, essentially the same. 
III BREACH OF CONFIDENCE AND PRIVACY SHOUW NOT BE 
TREATED DIFFERENTLY 
Traditionally the interests underlying the actions for breach of 
confidence and invasion of privacy have been considered as conceptually distinct. 
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Breach of confidence has generally been concerned with "maintain[ing] the fidelity 
or trust that the plaintiff has reposed in the person to whom he has confided."
91 
Privacy is based on a rationale which is "[ ... ] related to our concern over our 
accessibility to others: the extent to which we are known to others, the extent to 
which others have physical access to us, and the extent to which we are the subject 
of others attention."92
 Laster himself has recognised that without the relationship 
element, breach of confidence enlarges into a general right of privacy.
93 Since the 
development of the English judiciary in finding that a relationship of confidence or 
obligations of confidence (in a narrow sense) are no longer necessary before a court 
will find liability, I submit that the tort of invasion of privacy (at least, as I reiterate 
again, to the extent New Zealand protects privacy interests) is essentially breach of 
confidence but without a confidential relationship. 
Laster makes a number of important observations on what he thinks are the 
distinct interests underlying the tort of invasion of privacy and the action for breach 
of confidence. He is a strong advocate for keeping the interests underlying the two 
actions separate. I will discuss his views on the interests underlying breach of 
confidence and privacy and will then go on to discuss recent developments in the 
law which suggest that the interests are not substantially distinct and therefore, 
should not be treated differently. 
A Limited To The Public Disclosure of Private Facts 
It must be strictly kept in mind that New Zealand law only recognizes the 
protection of privacy as applying to the public disclosure of private facts about an 
individual. It does not extend so far as to protect an individuals ' interest in solitude 
or seclusion, as a separate head of invasion of privacy. It has been made clear then, 
that "[t]ort law in New Zealand has not yet developed 10 the point where a separate 
9 1 Raymond Wacks Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989) 127. 
92 Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" (1980) 89 YLR 421 , 423. 
93 Daniel Laster "Breaches of Confidence and Privacy By Misuse of Per onal Information" (1989) 7 
Otago LR 31 , 36. 
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cause of action is definitely available under this head."
94 It seems that because of the 
judicial failure to recognize that such interests in this branch of invasion of privacy, 
which involves essentially "a psychological need to preserve an intrusion-free zone 
of personality and family ' 95 the privacy interests here which arguably cannot be 
protected by an action for breach of confidence, have had no substantial relevance to 
the development of the law of privacy thus far. Arguably then, the cases which 
commentators such as Laster assert may not be adequately covered by an action for 
breach of confidence would not be covered by an action for invasion of privacy 
anyway. 
While those "invasions of privacy" which fall outside the confines of breach 
of confidence should be protected through some other medium, I am simply 
submitting that until these invasions can be adequately protected by some form of 
privacy law, that we should treat the privacy interests that are currently protected in 
New Zealand as being able to be protected by breach of confidence. The interests 
underlying this type of privacy protection are more akin to control over information, 
rather than the interests inherent in protecting significant, usually physical, 
intrusions into personal or private life, where an individual, to be enjoined in the 
"intrusion into solitude and seclusion" cause of action in privacy would only need to 
have obtained the information in some manner in the nature of prying. Liability is 
based upon "the unjustifiably intrusive way in which the defendant acted in 
breaching reasonable expectations to be left alone in a particular zone."
96 In contrast, 
the analysis of invasions of privacy in the types of situations which I am considering 
stems from a logical extension of the law on breach of confidence, and so I submit, 
should be dealt with under that head. 
B Laster's view: "The primary public interests which underlie breach of 
confulence are encouraging candour in relationships, enforcing undertakings of 
94 Katrine Evans "Of Privacy and Prostitutes" (2002) 20 NZULR 71, 90. 
95 L v G [2002] (21 January 2002) District Court Timaru NP202/00, 20 Abbott J. 
96 Evans , above, 91. 
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confulentiality, and recognizing an individual's autonomy to determine who 
should learn about them. In contrast, only the autonomy interest underlies a 
• . »97 privacy action. 
Laster takes the view that the comparable interest protected by breach of 
confidence and privacy is autonomy. As Laster himself has mentioned in a related 
article on breach of confidence and privacy, "The touchstone for [the] various 
formulations of privacy is individual autonomy in the form of an individual's 
dignity. In the context of personal information this would mean recognition of an 
individual's right to determine who can learn about the individual."
98 This signifies 
that what the individual is trying to protect, and what the courts are recognising 
when they grant injunctions or award damages to injured plaintiffs, is the individual 
right to control what information is divulged to the world around them. 
This view has been supported by numerous legal bodies and commentators.
99 
Although the inherent dignity of a person and the right to maintain a private life free 
from the unwarranted gaze of others are the core values which the courts can be said 
to be recognizing in protecting private or confidential information from disclosure, it 
is the feeling of the loss of control which is arguably the real damage to the 
individual. The concomitant of that is the hurt and indignity which arises from that 
loss of control. The English Justice Committee has recognised that "Above all we 
need to be able to keep to ourselves, if we want to, those thoughts and feelings, 
beliefs and doubts, hopes, plans, fears and fantasies, which we call "private" 
precisely because we wish to be able to choose freely with whom and to what extent, 
97 Daniel Laster "Commonalities Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy" (1990) 14 NZULR 
144, 144. 
98 Daniel Laster, "Breaches of Confidence and of Privacy by Misuse of Personal Information" (1989) 
7 Otago LR 31, 61. 
99 See for example, The Report of the Committee on Privacy (The Younger Report) ( 1972) Cmnd 
5012.at para 100, where the Committee noted that privacy consists of "freedom form intrusion and 
privacy of infonuation"; Thurston v Charles (1905) 21 TLR 659, at 660 (Ch) where Walton J said 
that the personal information contained in a letter "may be mainly valuable because it gives the 
plaintiff the right to keep it private" 
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we are willing to share them.' 
100 Again the references back to the element of control 
are what seems to be driving the protection afforded to individuals at present. An 
aspect of this element of control, which can be considered another underlying 
interest inherent in breach of confidence and privacy is directly related to the wider 
societal interest of promoting individual development. 
It has been suggested by John Stuart Mill that a social public policy rationale 
of protecting personal confidences stems from the benefits of allowing individuals to 
"develop to their utmost potential if they are given the opportunity to make their 
own choices about how to live their lives, irrespective of the judgments of others as 
to the values of those choices."
101This view makes it easier to assert that privacy and 
breach of confidentiality are not as different as is contended. If an underlying object 
of the law of confidence is to develop in the way Mill suggests above, this sounds 
very similar to a social policy for protecting the privacy of the individuals as we do 
in New Zealand. This is most apparent when we consider that among the choices 
which individuals can make, these "must surely be whether to make personal and 
private information available to others, or to keep it entirely secret, or to disclose it 
to a select few who are judged as entitled to know."
102 This was the view expressed 
by the High Court in Douglas v Hello! Ltd where the plaintiffs choice as to whom, 
when and where they disclosed their confidential information to, should not have 
been interfered with.
103 The development of individuals stemming from their 
choices, which can either include or exclude disclosure to the wider world, is 
encouraged through maintaining confidences of personal information in the same 
way as protecting personal information from disclosure under an invasion of privacy 
action. 
100 A Report by Justice Privacy and the Law (Stevens and Sons Ltd, London, 1970) para 13. 
101 Andrew McRobert Breach of Confidence: Revisiting the Protection of Surreptitiously Obtained 
Information" (2002) 13 AIPJ 69, 71 discussing John Stuart Mill On Liberty (Watts, London, 1929). 
'
02McRobert, above, 71 citing Megan Richardson "Breach of Confidence, Surreptitiously or 
Accidentally Obtained Information and Privacy: Theory Versus Law" (1994) 19 AIPJ 673,683. 
103 Douglas v Hello! Ud [2003] EWHC 786 paras 196-197 Lindsay J. 
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Considering that Laster does recognize that the autonomy interest present in 
privacy also exists in breach of confidence he recognizes that the overlap between 
breach of confidence and privacy in protecting this aspect of privacy signals the 
essential commonality between the two actions. The concomitant of this would 
therefore be that the interests inherent in a privacy action can be fully protected 
under a breach of confidence action (remembering that this is in light of the fact that 
the limited form of privacy as protected in New Zealand reflects the same privacy 
interests as breach of confidence presently does). Indeed, the form of breach of 
privacy which we do recognize has been described as a "species of breach of 
confidence" .104 If this is so, and an already well-established cause of action in breach 
of confidence exists, it would not be wise to continue to maintain a parallel cause of 
action, acknowledged to be undefined in scope and definition, and as having no 
substantial history of jurisprudence to infuse its application or promote its 
understanding. 
The privacy interests which the tort of privacy in New Zealand aims to 
protect, can fall squarely within the ambit of breach of confidence. As Laster has 
stated, "breach of confidence decisions are quite useful with regard to several key 
aspects of any privacy claim, including what is private, the duration of any such 
right, any public interest consideration, and remedies."
105 The only key differences 
between the two are the existence of a confidential relationship in breach of 
confidence, and the presence of the test, of whether the disclosure is offensive or 
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, in privacy. 
106 
Laster's focus on a relationship of confidence and its impact on the 
additional interests in breach of confidence has led to his assertions of what he 
thinks is the touchstone for a breach of confidence action - "whether trust can be 
104 Hosking v Runting (30 May 2003) High Court Auckland CP527/02 Randerson J para 77 
discussing Campbell v MGN [2003] EWCA Civ 1373. 
105 Daniel Laster "Breach of Confidence and of Privacy by Misuse of Personal Information" (1989) 7 
Otago LR 31, 67. 
106 See P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591, 60 l (HC) where Nicholson J sets out the test for the trot of 
invasion of privacy relating to the public disclosure of private facts. 
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found to have been reposed in and accepted by the recipient."
107 I submit that his 
arguments are based essentially on this now outdated element of " [ r]eliance and 
acceptance of responsibility"
108 (at least in relation to personal information) and that 
the bases or interests underlying breach of confidence actions have evolved. The 
action is no longer concerned primarily with upholding obligations of confidence or 
recognizing the importance of maintaining the integrity of confidential relationships, 
as the next section will illustrate. It has evolved to meet the pressing need of 
protecting individuals' privacy interests in keeping information which they do not 
wish to share with the greater population, private. The limited tort of invasion of 
privacy which New Zealand currently recognizes has the same purpose. Laster's 
views need to be updated and perhaps discarded in light of this view. It is on this 
basis that I argue, in opposition to Laster, that breach of confidence and privacy are 
not significantly different, and so the law does not need to maintain a distinction 
between them. 
C Privacy and Confidentiality Are Essentially The Same 
The approaches of a number of the English courts, as set out below, 
challenge the validity, nowadays, of Laster's view primarily applicable in 
jurisdictions where no tort of privacy exists.A relationship is not needed because the 
courts now look to more than inherent undertakings of good faith between parties -
they see that circumstances, the vulnerability of plaintiffs, and the often 
unscrupulous methods of defendants in obtaining and divulging confidential or 
private information" can lead to liability. I submit that privacy, as a separate tort, 
picked up where a traditional relationship could not be found in breach of 
confidence, but acted for the same purpose - control over personal information. 
1 The Relationship Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy: Protection 
Already Exists 
107 Daniel Laster "Breach of Confidence and of Privacy by Misuse if Personal Information" (1989) 7 
Otago LR 31, 39. 
'
08Laster, above, 39. 
30 
The most compelling argument for stating that breach of confidence and 
privacy should be treated similarly is that protection for privacy already exists under 
breach of confidence. Mummery LJ in Wainwright v Home Office
109
, for example, as 
well as stating that there are already torts protecting an individual's bodily, home 
and personal property, said that breach of confidence can adequately protect 
"personal information, private communications and correspondence."
110 In 
contrast to Laster' s views, Mummery J's approach is one of "incremental evolution, 
both at common law and by statute ..... , of traditional nominate torts pragmatically 
crafted as to conditions of liability, specific defences and appropriate remedies, and 
tailored to suit significantly different privacy interests and infringement 
situations". 111 He maintained that this was a more "promising and well trod path"
11 2 
This is the key argument in stating that because privacy and confidentiality are so 
closely related, there is no need to create a new tort for privacy protection. 
Protection already exists. 
The most important comment which I think is most relevant to rebutting 
Laster's assertions is that breach of confidence has changed over the past decade, 
and should keep abreast of changes in the world. In Theakston v MGN, Ousely J 
recognized this and stated that " .. there would seem to be merit in recognizing that 
the original concept of breach of confidence has in this particular category of cases 
now developed into something different from the commercial and employment 
relationships with which confidentiality is mainly concerned."
11 3 This is the key to 
understanding the differences which I advance in opposition to Laster. 
2 The Relationship Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy: The Human 
Rights Act 1998 
109 Wainwright v Home Office [2001) EWCA Civ 2081 
110 Wainwright v Home Office, above, para 57 where Mummery LJ, cited a comment from The Report 
by Justice on Privacy and the Law at paragraph 30: "it is generally recognised that at the present time 
there is no existing common law remedy for invasion of privacy." 
111 Wainwright v Home Office, above, para 60 Mummery LJ. 
11 2 Wainwright v Home Office, above, para 60 Mummery LJ. 
113 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002) EWHC 137 para 28 Ouseley J . 
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The approach of the English judiciary as illustrated above, has been infused 
with considerations of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires courts, whenever 
entertaining actions which may impact on a person's freedom of expression, to have 
regard to privacy, confidentiality, and freedom of expression. 114 
In Douglas and Others v Hello! Ltd' 15, Lindsay J, while stating that he would 
not go so far as to recognize a tort of privacy in England, 116 assumed that the 
Human Rights Act 1998 has filled in some of the gaps "as might exist when neither 
the law of confidence nor any other law protected a claimant". 117 Citing the 
comments made in Wainwright v Home Office 118that there was no general right to 
privacy under the law of England and the Human Rights Act 1998 had not created 
one, 119 Justice Lindsay accepted that while the Human Rights Act does not give rise 
to an action for privacy under its own head, nonetheless the interests which it 
protects can be enforced through the action for breach of confidence. This would be 
through the courts having a strong regard to the privacy interests which the Act 
protects, when dealing with breach of confidence actions. He opined that the views 
of Sedley J in the interlocutory judgment of Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd120 were 
based on seeing the law as being inadequate to protect and enforce rights to privacy, 
but that this is not the case. Areas of law such as confidence already provide 
"protection and enforcement .... in theory [and] also in practice ... As I have held Mr 
and Mrs Douglas to have been protected by the Jaw of confidence, no relevant hole 
exists in English law as such ...... " 
114 See Articles 8, and l O of The International Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
115 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2003) EWHC Ch 786. 
116 Douglas v Hello! Ltd, above, para 229 Justice Lindsay. 
117 Douglas v Hello! Ltd, above, para 229 Justice Lindsay. 
118 [2001) EWCA Civ 2081 (CA). 
119 Douglas v Hello! Ltd, above, para 229 Justice Lindsay. 
120 [2001) QB 967 (CA) Sedley J. 
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In Theakston v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd121 a well-known television 
presenter visited a brothel, and had engaged in sexual relations with three prostitutes. 
Photographs had been taken, and one of the prostitutes subsequently sold her story 
and the photographs to MON Limited. The plaintiff took an action for breach of 
confidence and invasion of privacy. The court made it clear that whether or not a tort 
of privacy exists or not does not necessarily impact on the ability and willingness of 
the courts to give due weight to privacy interests of individuals as set out in the 
Human Rights Act 1998. 122 Ouseley J stated that the convention right to the 
protection of privacy could always have been considered by the courts in deciding 
cases such as the present, albeit, under a breach of confidence head (or already 
established cause of action) and at present that the Human Rights Act privacy rights 
are afforded to individuals through this cause of action. He then went on to comment 
that this approach must be informed with the jurisprudence of article 8 of the 
Convention (as appended to the Human Rights Act ) and consequently, whether 
finding liability under breach of confidence or invasion of privacy may be "little 
more than deciding what label is to be attached to the cause of action." 123 
The court in A v B plc and Another124 also took the view that the Human 
Rights Act gave weight to actions for breach of confidence in protecting privacy 
interests. Lord Woolf CJ mentioned that in regards to articles 8 and 10 of the 
Convention (protecting privacy and freedom of expression respectively), "[t]hese 
articles have provided new parameters within which the court will decide, in an 
action for breach of confidence, whether a person is entitled to have his privacy 
protected by the court or whether the restriction of freedom of expression which 
such protection involves cannot be justified". 125 The position which I take is very 
much supported with the comment of Lord Woolf when he says that: "It is most 
unlikely that any purpose will be served by a judge seeking to decide whether there 
exists a new cause of action in tort which protects privacy. In the great majority of 
121 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC QB 137 Ousely J. 
122 Theakston v MGN Ltd, above, para 27 Ousely J. 
123 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC QB 137. 
124 A v B pie and Another (2002] EWCA Civ 337. 
125 A v B pie and Another, above, para 4. 
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situations, if not all situations, where the protection of privacy is justified, relating to 
events after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, an action for breach of 
confidence now will , where this is appropriate, provide the necessary protection." 126 
3 Relationship Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy - Breach of 
Confidence Is Not Enough? Peck v United Kingdom 
The case of Peck v United Kingdom 127 is an important case in its implications 
for the law relating to breach of confidence and privacy as it stands in England at 
present and goes towards finding that breach of confidence, in certain situations, will 
not be able to afford privacy protection to individuals. 
Mr Peck was walking down a public street in England, brandishing a knife. 
He attempted to commit suicide on the street by cutting his wrists. Closed circuit 
television filmed the footage of him brandishing the knife, but not his attempted 
suicide. An operator saw Peck and alerted the police, who came to his aid and got 
him medical assistance. The council in charge of the circuit system decided to 
publish certain stills of that footage in a number of publications and later television 
programmes. This was under the belief that showing such a situation and its 
successful outcome would promote the advantage of having such a system in place. 
Peck was subsequently identified by friends and family who saw him in one of the 
television broadcasts. He decided to take his case to the Press Complaints 
Commission, but lost on the grounds that he was in a public place at the time, and 
could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances. His 
complaint was dismissed, as was his application to the High Court for judicial 
review of the decision, even though they recognized that his privacy had actually 
been breached by the Council ' s actions. He therefore took his case to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR found that the disclosure of the 
material constituted a disproportionate and unjustified interference with Peck's 
126 A v B pie and Another, above, para 11. 
127 (2003) EMLR 15 (ECHR) 
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privacy in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention of Fundamental Freedoms 
and Human Rights, and so a remedy was available. What was important in the case 
was their recognition of the inadequate avenues of redress available for an individual 
in Peck's situation. The court found that Peck did not have a remedy in breach of 
confidence at the time of the disclosure of the information (and assumedly not 
presently either) contrary to the submissions of the Crown. This was primarily 
because it would have been unlikely that the images had the necessary quality of 
confidence about them or were imparted (notwithstanding that the court did 
recognize that a positive act of imparting was not necessarily required) in 
confidential circumstances, as well as once the information was m the public 
domain, its republication would not have been actionable as a breach of 
confidence. 128 The government' s submissions were that if the applicant had an 
expectation of privacy, this could have formed a basis for breach of confidence. 129 
The court rejected this for the reasons above. 
I make a tentative submission that perhaps, in light of the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act (which was not actually in force at the time), the submissions of 
the Crown were valid. In light of the developments and jurisprudence which had 
been developing, perhaps Peck may have been able to make an argument for breach 
of confidentiality, especially when looking at the method of obtainment of the 
footage by the council, and the manner of disclosure, both aspects which can go 
towards finding an obligation of confidentiality even in light of the publicly 
accessible place he was in at the time. I am supported by the comments of 
Randerson J in Hosking v Runting130 where he discusses this very issue. He says, at 
paragraph 92 of the judgment, "It may be doubted whether the courts of the United 
Kingdom would now come to the same conclusion in Mr Peck' s case. Although he 
was undoubtedly filmed in a public place, the overall circumstances might well 
128 Peck, above, para 111. 
129 Peck, above, para 111. 
130 Hosking v Ru11ti11g (30 May 2003) High Court Auckland CP527/02 Randerson J. 
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persuade a domestic court that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that a 
duty of confidence arose on the part of the local authority ..... " 131 
4 Privacy and Confidentiality Should Not Be Treated Differently. 
The approach taken by the English courts especially after the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, to breach of confidence should give an indication of how 
the interests of confidentiality and privacy are not as distinct as Laster would 
contend. One encompasses the other. This was so, to a great extent even before the 
introduction of this Act. 
I am not advancing the proposition that a relationship in breach of confidence 
is not still an important element in situations where trade secrets or government 
secrets are involved, for example. Considerations are different depending on the 
nature of the information at stake, and obviously in cases involving commercial 
information, the value is placed on a relationship which has been breached and not 
just a proprietary value of the information to the plaintiff. 
Breach of confidence has been used to protect personal information since it 
was first incepted. A logical conclusion could be that especially since breach of 
confidence is founded in equity, it would evolve eventually to meet the needs of its 
time. This is what equity is about. I am simply asserting that there is no longer such 
a difference between confidentiality and privacy interests specifically in regard to 
personal information and that breach of confidence will provide more certainty, 
scope and definition than the newly recognised and extremely vast notion of privacy. 
IV WHERE IS THIS SIMILARITY DEALT WITH BY THE RECENT LAW? 
As I have started to illustrate in the previous section, breach of confidence 
and privacy are interlinked to a great extent already. Both actions protect the privacy 
131 Hosking v Runting, above, para 93 Randerson J. 
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interests of plaintiffs through the element, as Laster has defined it, of autonomy -
autonomy to do as one wishes, to be free from the judgment of others and therefore 
to be able (to some extent) to control how much of our private lives we divulge to 
others. As Laster himself acknowledges, breach of confidence has the protection of 
privacy interests underlying it -"recognizing an individual's autonomy to determine 
who should learn about them." 132 
A number of cases in England and even Australia (historical and present-
day) have therefore dealt with the similarity in the interests of both actions by 
supporting the view that a relationship of confidentiality is not essential for an action 
in breach of confidence to succeed. The courts have effectively replaced the 
traditional need for a relationship with other considerations in finding protection for 
privacy interests. The method of obtainment of confidential information, the 
circumstances in which information is disclosed, 133 together with the addition of 
privacy interests have formed a fluid test in dealing with both the confidentiality and 
inherent privacy interests of individuals. 
A Method of Obtainment is Sufficient 
The Australian case of Franklin v Giddins 134 found that the unconscionable 
actions of the defendant in stealing trade secrets from the plaintiff was sufficient to 
found an action for breach of confidence, again where there was no relationship of 
confidence involved. Although this case did not concern personal information, and 
the law as to surreptitiously obtained information is relatively uncontroversial, 
Franklin v Giddins still shows the recognition of an important development in 
Australian legal jurisprudence, which was recognised recently by the Australian 
High Court in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats 135 where 
Callinan J said that Franklin v Giddins had signaled "the beginning of the demise of 
132 Daniel Laster "Commonalities Between Breach of Confidence and Privacy" (1990) 14 NZULR 
144,144 
133 Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 414,415 (HC) Deane J. 134 [1978) Qd R 72 (SC) Dunn J. 
135 [2001] HCA 63 (HC) . 
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the need for a prior relationship for the imposition of an obligation of confidence."136 
This shows strong support for the development of the action through the discarding 
of a relationship of confidence and also support for the view that such was 
recognized in some of the early cases on breach of confidence. 
More recently, in England, in the case of Hellewell v Chief Constable of 
Derbyshire137 it was stated that the "use of information derived from photographic 
surveillance of "private acts" would, in the absence of any defence of 
justification .... amount to a breach of confidence" .138 This again lends weight to the 
view that a simple method of obtainment of personal information in a way which 
invades the privacy of another can be protected adequately under the breach of 
confidence doctrine. This has been made possible by the willingness of the courts to 
develop and adapt the requirements of breach of confidence to the circumstances of 
the time and, consequently have increasingly protected essential private interests of 
individuals. 
B Circumstances of Disclosure Are Sufficient 
The similarly factual cases of Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ltd139 and 
Creation Records Ltd v News group Newspapers Ltd140 give recognition to 
circumstances being able to construct obligations akin to confidence in protecting 
individuals from disclosure of information. Although the information was 
considered to be of a non-personal nature, the approach taken by the courts can give 
a general guide as to when obligations of confidentiality to personal information 
may arise - when the circumstances are so clear as to taint the confidence breaker 
with knowledge of confidentiality, and so bind them if they break their imputed 
obligations. Both courts found that the taking of photographs of scenes of a film set 
136 [2001] HCA 63 (HC) para 301 Callinan J. 
137 [1995] 4 All ER 473 (QB) Laws J . 
138 Andrew McRobert "Breach of Confidence: Revisiting the Protection of Surreptitiously Obtained 
Information" (2002) 13 AIPJ 69, 78 discussing Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire, above, at 
478-479. 
139 Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ud [1994] EMLR 134 (Ch). 
14° Creation Films Ud v News Croup Newspapers Ltd (1997) 39 IPR l (Ch). 
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and a music video set respectively, by photographers amounted to a breach of 
confidence. The security measures (implicit stating of confidentiality) in place and 
signs (explicit mentioning of confidentiality) stating that no photography was to take 
place were sufficient to fix the defendants in both cases with confidential obligations 
- the photographers would have known, on reasonable grounds that "[they were] 
obtaining the information, that is to say the view of the scene, in confidence, at least 
to the extent that [they were] obliged by that confidentiality not to photograph the 
scene." 141 
In the Court of Appeal case of Douglas v Hello! Ltd
142,the court cited 
Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire
143 and opined that Laws J had given some 
very persuasive dicta on the issue. Keene J went on to comment that such a case 
gave persuasiveness to the view that "a pre-existing confidential relationship 
between the parties is not required for a breach of confidence suit. The nature of the 
subject matter or the circumstances of the defendant' s activities may suffice in some 
instances to give liability for breach of confidence."
144 Sedley J also went on to 
make the comment that the law of breach of confidence "no longer needs to 
construct an artificial relationship of confidentiality between intruder and victim: it 
can recognize privacy itself as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of 
personal autonomy." 14
5 
C Considerations of Privacy Interests are Sufficient 
The courts have looked at primarily either the nature of the information in 
question, or the method of obtainment of the information to satisfy themselves that a 
breach of confidence has occuned, in regards to personal information. It has been 
14 1 Creation Records Ud v News Group Newspapers Ud (1997) 39 IPR 1, 7-8 (Ch) Lloyd J. 
142 [2001] 2 All ER 289 (CA) 
143 Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [ 1995] 4 All ER 473 (QB) 
144 Douglas v Hello! Ud (2001) 2 All ER 289, 329-330 (CA) Keene J. 
145 Douglas v Hello! Ud, above. 
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historically acknowledged that this is a welcome extension of the law of breach of 
confidence, especially where express confidential relationships do not exist. 
Reiterating agam that Laster's arguments are based on his disputable 
prerruse that a confidential relationship or confidential circumstances must be 
present before a court can provide protection for the unauthorized disclosure of 
personal information, Lindsay J's approach in Douglas v Hello! Ltd show a 
willingness to focus on the privacy aspects of the personal information at stake in an 
action for breach of confidence and not on a need for such a relationship. 
Lindsay J, in discussing the case of A v B pie and Another
146 said that: "A 
duty of confidence will arise when the party subject to the duty of confidence knows 
or ought to know that the other person reasonable expects their privacy to be 
protected. The existence of a relationship such as to create a duty of confidence will 
commonly have to be inferred from the facts."
147 
This principle identifies clearly that in most cases where confidences of a 
personal kind are in issue, a relationship of confidence or circumstances importing 
such an obligation of confidentiality will be very hard to find. Therefore, the courts 
will be willing to infer or even create such a "relationship" to satisfy the traditional 
"confidential circumstances" element. The relationship is inferred from the fact that 
a person would reasonably expect his or her privacy to be protected in certain 
situations. 
Lord Woolf recently concurred in this view in the case of A v B pie where he, 
in giving due weight to privacy interests in an action for breach of confidence, stated 
that "If there is an intrusion in a situation where a person can reasonably expect his 
privacy to be respected then that intrusion will be capable of giving rise to liability 
m an action for breach of confidence unless the intrusion can be 
146 A v B pie v Another [2002] EWCA Civ 337. 
147 Douglas v Hello! lld [2003] EWHC Ch 786 para 186 Justice Lindsay citing A v B pie and Another 
[2002] EWCA Civ 337 at para 11. 
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justified"148(emphasis added). This also picks up on the earlier comments made by 
Lord Philips in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers (which I shall discuss further 
below) that reasonable expectations of privacy can form an inherent part of the 
action for breach of confidence, and so can stand in replacement of a relationship of 
confidence. 149 
Further on in Douglas Lindsay J stated that "the scope for breach of 
confidence must now be evaluated in light of the obligations in the Human Rights 
Act 1998, via regarding the opposed rights in Articles 8 (privacy) and 10 (freedom 
of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights as "absorbed into the 
action for breach of confidence and as thereby to some extent giving it new strength 
and breadth." 150 
This is important in recognizing that the courts must place great emphasis 
on individual rights, especially when it comes to individuals ' privacy, rather than on 
the artificial need f9r a relationship. Consequently, as there is no recognised privacy 
tort in England, those interests would best be protected by being subsumed within an 
action that can be widely interpreted to enable that protection. Hence, the courts 
would be more willing to loosen the strings around strict requirements, and be 
encouraging of international human rights legislation such as embodied, in England, 
in the Human Rights Act 1998, to help support and justify a generous application of 
the law. 
One final comment which is important for the extent to which privacy 
interests are becoming a replacement test for a relationship is through the 
recognition that when a court is considering whether to grant relief in a journalistic 
148 A v B plc and Another [2002] EWCA Ci v 337 para 11. 
149 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Limited (2002] EWCA Civ 1373 para 70 Lord Philips. 
150 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2003] EWHC Ch 786 para 186 Justice Lindsay. 
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case, which may affect the Convention right to freedom of expression, the court 
must have particular regard to any relevant privacy code/s.
151 
Again, this would seem to reiterate that privacy interests must be 
regarded as important in any, albeit journalistic, case wherever relief may be granted 
and which may impact on freedom of expression. This would implicitly recognize 
that relevant privacy codes, which exist and confer limited rights on plaintiffs (in 
regard to the broadcaster) but which do not have the force of law behind them, 
signals a willingness to incorporate privacy jurisprudence into the test for breach of 
confidence. The courts clearly believe that such privacy protection guidelines must 
be a factor to be balanced when deciding cases of breach of confidence involving 
personal information, and where no traditional relationship of confidence can be 
inferred. 
D A Problem is Encountered - Is there too much overlap between Breach of 
Confulence and Privacy? 
The court in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd
152 seemed to 
incorporate a privacy-type analysis in determining whether there was a breach of 
confidence as a whole. Lord Philips firstly asked whether the information about 
Miss Campbell attending drug counseling was confidential (or private) by applying 
the test of whether "a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, on reading that 
Miss Campbell was a drug addict, would find it highly offensive, or even offensive, 
that the Mirror also disclosed that she was attending meetings of Narcotics 
Anonymous."
153 The court did not find any breach of confidentiality, it seems, firstly 
because the facts disclosed were not sufficiently confidential, applying the test 
above. Lord Philips then went on to state that the disclosure of such facts was not 
151 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (2003] EWHC Ch 786 para 186 Justice Lindsay discussing section 12(1) and
 
(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
152 [2002] EWCA Civ 1373. 
153 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers (2002] EWCA Civ 1373. 
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"of sufficient significance to shock the conscience and justify the intervention of the 
court." 154 
It seems that the Court of Appeal replaced the test of breach of confidence 
for personal information with the test for privacy as found in New Zealand - with no 
mention of a confidential relationship or confidential circumstances being explicitly 
made. This may be by reason of the fact that privacy, in the way Miss Campbell was 
trying to put forward her case, was accepted as a branch of breach of confidence, as 
was suggested by counsel, and apparently accepted by the court. The key passage in 
the judgment to this effect maintains "The development of the Jaw of confidentiality 
since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force has seen the information 
described as 'confidential not where it has been confided by one person to another, 
but where it relates to an aspect of an individual's private life which he does not 
choose to make public."
155 This judgment it implicitly recognizes that actions which 
can be termed as protecting plaintiffs from a breach of privacy can be entertained by 
the courts again, as reiterated in the above mentioned cases, without a need for a 
confidential relationship. While it is desirable that privacy interests are adequately 
protected under breach of confidence, it does not seem wise to simply transplant a 
privacy based test into a breach of confidence action. While I still assert that the two 
tests effectively protect exactly the same type of information, and have the same 
interests to protect, the elements are slightly different in each and must be 
incorporated into breach of confidence more so than arbitrarily transplanting the 
elements of privacy into an action and calling it breach of confidence. Some stability 
and definition is still required for plaintiffs to have an opportunity of gaining the 
maximum protections possible under the law. 
154 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers, above, para 56 Lord Philips. 
155 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers, above, para 70 Lord Philips. 
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V WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
We have seen Laster's arguments, in the context of the traditional view of 
breach of confidence, on why a relationship of confidence is an essential pre-
requisite to found an action in breach of confidence. We have also seen the 
similarity in the important interests which underlie both breach of confidence and 
privacy. The approach of the English courts and how they dealt with the similarity in 
interests between the two actions, was also discussed above. The final considerations 
must therefore be whether legislation would be a more prudent solution in the area 
of protection of personal information also whether it is even necessary or wise to 
follow the same path in New Zealand as has been taken by our Commonwealth 
neighbours. 
A Is Legislation the Answer? 
An argument for legislation to protect privacy interests was made in England 
m 1970, but no Parliamentary action has been taken to date (if you exclude the 
Human Rights Act 1998 ). The Report by Justice was satisfied that a case had been 
made out for this, including among other things, the growth of technology which 
give new means of intrusion without any breach of existing laws
156
; the accessibility 
of data collection storage facilities and the ease with which this can be done
157
; and 
the publication of private material through global publication mechanisms. 
It was further argued that if developing the law based on common law tort of 
invasion of privacy, there would need to be a substantial number of cases dealing 
with personal confidential information, which would take too much time - "it seems 
likely that very many years would be required to bring the law of privacy in England 
156 A Report by Justice Privacy and the Law (Stevens and Sons Ltd, London, 1970) para 110. 
157 A Report by Justice, above, para 114. 
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to the point which it has reached in the U.S.A. today. And that, in our view, would 
be far too late."
158 If a tort of privacy should be established firmly in England (or in 
any jurisdiction) legislation would arguably give the most a consistent framework 
without the need for a piecemeal approach as has been the case, for example in the 
United States. 15
9 
This was the view of Lindsay J in Douglas v Hello! Ltd
160
, where he stated 
that the subject of privacy is "better left to Parliament which can, of course, consult 
interests far more widely than can be taken into account in the course of ordinary 
inter parties litigation."
161 Justice Lindsay recognized that there are areas where the 
law of breach of confidence may be inadequate to protect all of the interests which 
may arise in disputes, and commented on the judgment of Peck v United Kingdom 
162 where the inadequacies of the English law in this regard, were highlighted. 
Lindsay J concludes "That inadequacy will have to be made good and if Parliament 
does not step in then the courts will be obliged to."
163 The course of the judiciary 
"creating the law bit by bit" will be thrust upon the judiciary but only in a case 
where the "existing law of confidence gives no or inadequate protection."
164 While I 
will focus on the issue of the "answer" legislation later on, I will argue for a 
different interpretation of this statement. If Parliament has already seen fit to 
recognize that privacy interests exist and should be afforded adequate protection, as 
set out in the Human Rights Act, surely this is encouragement for the 
implementation of this policy into the judicial process. But this does not necessarily 
mean through the process of creating a tort of privacy. The same interests can be 
protected by the courts developing the law through equitable principles, and well-
reasoned jurisprudence but in the context of breach of confidence. And, perhaps 
instead of the English court considering that it has to be forced into the role of 
158 A Report by Justice, above, para 121. 
159 A Report by Justice, above, para 122. 
160 [2003) EWHC Ch 786. 
161 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2003) EWHC Ch 786 para 229 Justice Lindsay. 
162 [2003) EMLR 15 (ECHR). 
163 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2003] EWHC Ch 786 para 229 Justice Lindsay. 
164 Douglas v Hello! Ltd, above, para 229 Justice Lindsay. 
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creating protection for individuals via a new tort, they could be encouraged into 
developing the Jaw, where law already exists. 
B The New Zealand Position 
It has been recognised, in New Zealand, that a relationship of confidentiality 
can be found implicitly "as a result of the individual circumstances and the 
objectively reasonable expectations of the parties,"
165 although New Zealand courts 
still focus on the need for a relationship, in the traditional sense.
166 In 
Crown Houses (New Zealand) Ltd v Cooper, for example, France J after citing the 
"essential" element of an obligation of confidence as set out in Coco v AN Clark 
167
, 
reiterated that a relationship of confidence implies some measure of positive dealing 
between the relevant parties. 
168 Nicholson J in Earl v Baddeley by virtue of an 
employment-type confidential relationship being in existence, the relationship of 
confidence element was fulfilled- the defendant was under an obligation of 
confidence because of his involvement as a member of a committee who dismissed 
the plaintiff from his employed position.
169 A case more relevant to personal 
interests is the case of P v D
170 where arguments based on breach of confidence in 
relation to medical and psychiatric information failed. The judge stated that on the 
facts, that plaintiff in no way could have been in a confidential relationship with the 
defendant. The confidant had simply gleaned information about the plaintiff (a high 
profile celebrity who had previously been in a psychiatric institution) from other 
sources. 171 The limitations on the present law relating to breach of confidence, such 
as maintaining a relatively conservative view on the need for a confidential 
relationship, will only hinder progress in developing the law. 
165 Katrine Evans "Of Privacy and Prostitutes" (2002) 20 NZULR 71, 96. 
166 Evans, above,96. 
167 [1969] RPC 41 at 47 (HC) Megarry J. 
168 (4 April 2003) High Court Napier CP3/03, 21 France J 
169 (18 May 2001) High Court Auckland CP583-5DOO, para 13 Nicholson J. 
170 p VD [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC). 
171 p v D, above, 595 Nicholson J. 
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The modem developments in society have in tum pushed for modem 
developments in the law. It is in this sense that Randerson J supports a traditional 
cause of action to adapt to protect privacy interests of the twenty-first century. It is 
on this basis that I submit that his comments hold great force, and so should be 
. 1 d. . 112 imp emente mto practice. 
Recently, in response to the shake-up of pnvacy law by Randerson J, 
Rosemary Tobin makes essentially the same comments as Laster did in 1990. She 
says that "the two causes of action are designed to protect completely different 
things ..... [t]he actions are conceptually distinct and should remain so."
173 Again, 
while Tobin advances the same arguments, she does not consider that the recent 
English approach has or should change our approach to breach of confidence, but 
seems fixed on the idea that personal information has not called for a differing 
approach in the application of the traditional doctrine. Perhaps this is where the 
problem lies. In not accepting that an equitable action can evolve to meet certain 
circumstances, even where the possibility of creating a whole new tort exists, 
prudent development of the law will always be hindered. This was recognised in 
Theakston174 and A v B pie and Another.
175 She goes on immediately to say that the 
development was indeed necessary in order for courts to protect "the person's 
reasonable expectations of privacy. No such development is necessary where a 
privacy tort is already in existence."
176 This is not true. 
Breach of confidence should be utilized to protect privacy interests that can 
fit into the elements of breach of confidence rather than embarking on a task to find 
the extent to which the elements of privacy protect privacy interests themselves. 
172 See Katrine Evans "Of Privacy and Prostitutes" (2002) 20 NZULR 71 at 96-97. where she states 
it has indeed been recognised that if in a particular case a plaintiff does not plead privacy or it fails on 
the particular facts for whatever reason, New Zealand courts may have regard to the English courts' 
approach to breach of confidence and personal information - "If a person comes into possession of 
information which is obviously highly sensitive, and which is not meant for broader publication, that 
p.erson's conscience may be fixed by an obligation of confidence, which is remediable." 
73 Rosemary Tobin ''Privacy: One step Forward, Two Steps Back" (2003) NZLJ 256, 258. 
174 (2002] EWHC QB 137. 
175 (2002] EWCA Civ 337. 
176 Rosmeary Tobin, above, 258. 
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Breach of confidence could encompass the situations which the invasion of privacy 
does at present. For those situations which it does not cover, privacy will be able to 
offer protection but only to the extent left by the inadequacies of breach of 
confidence - which would not be substantial considering the limited form of privacy 
which New Zealand protects at the moment. Tobin's comment in regards to privacy, 
that 'the common law has been developing precisely as it is intended to do - on a 
principled basis, incrementally and case by case" should be equally applicable to the 
development of breach of confidence to do the same, and within already established 
deeply entrenched legal jurisprudence so far. 
C "But England and New Zealand are Different" 
There have been strong arguments about the reasons for the development of 
breach of confidence in England to the extent today in protecting privacy interests, 
primarily because no other avenue has been available. The Court of Appeal in 
Kaye v Robertson 177 made it clear that there was no common law tort of invasion of 
privacy. It is on this basis that it has been asserted that the English judiciary has 
therefore been forced to develop breach of confidentiality in the way they have to 
sufficiently protect plaintiffs ' privacy interests. It follows that since New Zealand 
already recognises a limited right to privacy, the development of breach of 
confidence following England, would serve no useful purpose. 
My response to this is that even if the English judiciary has been forced into 
developing the law of breach of confidence, this does not change the fact that it is 
perhaps a more prudent course to take than creating or maintaining a new tort 
parallel with existing legal recourse. In adapting an existing cause of action to fit the 
needs of their society, where no other option has been available, significant 
protection has being afforded to individuals in England, who would not otherwise 
have received such. The law is working, and it is working relatively well. In 
regards to why New Zealand should adopt the English approach, my argument rests 
on two considerations - substantial benefits to the court and benefits to the public. 
177 Kaye v Robertson (1990] IPR 147 (CA). 
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If a parallel action is available for both privacy and breach of confidence, the 
law would no doubt become conflated and also confusing. If the courts are able to 
entertain actions to protect privacy interests under two causes of action (which they 
undoubtedly are, although not to the extent of the English courts) the process of 
determining which action should be invoked and which is best to grant a remedy 
under may become time-consuming and lead to inefficiency in the legal system. If 
there were one single cause of action, the law relating to privacy interests would be 
able to be defined to some degree. This would in tum lead to promoting its 
understanding and application in cases. Furthermore, judges would be able to 
develop relatively consistent principles and rules applicable to the area of personal 
information protection. The law from both original causes of action can be used to 
inform the application of considerations more relevant to each but within the 
confines of a unified cause of action. 
As to the wider public benefit, with one single cause of action, media and 
possible defendants would at least know where they stand in regards to determining 
what a sufficient public interest is in the circumstances of any particular case. If two 
public interest tests are available, as is arguably the case according to Laster, 
depending on whether the action is brought under privacy or breach of confidence, 
this places an unfair burden on defendants in finding out which public interest to 
apply. If there was one action available, at least there would be some certainty as to 
what will satisfy the public interest in a general case. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Raymond Wacks has said that "[e]xcept as a general abstraction of an 
underlying value, it should not be used as a means to describe a legal right or cause 
of action." 178 He links the problems inherent with not being able to protect 
individuals' privacy as being linked to the standpoint of privacy to begin with. If 
178 Raymond Wacks The Protection of Privacy (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1980) 21. 
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legislation is the only reasonable remedy in the circumstances) should be enacted to 
protect certain privacy interests, this should be done, as mentioned, not from the 
standpoint of privacy, as it would add more problems than it solves.
179 He would 
focus on a regulation of personal information via legislation as the core answer for 
the core problem faced by individuals. A circular argument perhaps. The law is 
inherently ambiguous, but we can only solve the law if we solve the ambiguity of the 
concept. This seems like a task which the courts and commentators have so far been 
unable to do. Instead, privacy interests which have been defined as being able to fall 
within an autonomy type basis as Laster argues, can and should be protected within 
the doctrine for breach of confidence. 
Laster' s arguments are based on an assumption that breach of confidence 
requires a confidential relationship and that it cannot adequately protect privacy 
interests - "the action is inadequate because, despite arguments to the contrary, the 
action appears to lie only in circumstances where there exists a relationship of 
confidence between the plaintiff and the person who breaches it - a relationship that 
does not exist in typical instances of either "intrusion" or "public disclosure" . 
180 This 
view is now misplaced, as has been discussed above. 
A focus on previous interests of which breach of confidence sought to protect 
will obscure the range of interests which it is now capable of protecting now. If the 
basis is asserted as being only to "protect the business interests of [a] plaintiff rather 
than his interests in preserving privacy"
181 then the law will of course stand still and 
not be able to protect that which it is demonstratably capable of. New Zealand 
should follow England's lead. As Morris J has said, "the action of breach of 
confidence is one developed by the courts and as such is a living evolving 
doctrine." 182 The Jaw has developed in England. It should do so here. 
179 Wacks, above, 22. 
180 Wacks, above, 15 . 
18 1 Wacks, above, 16. 
182 Roselea Funeral Home Ud v Willetts (8 November 1996) High Court Rotorua CPl0/95, 7-8 
Morris J. 
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